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Introduction 
Transportation infrastructures are expensive and often involve large cost overruns. Projects 
become more expensive than was initially estimated and additional budget is required. 
Consequently, as the total budget for infrastructure investments is generally fixed, the budget 
to cover the costs of other projects is insufficient. Cost overruns therefore not only result in 
financial consequences for the project under consideration but also ultimately in fewer 
infrastructure projects being realised than planned. The problem of cost overruns is even 
more disturbing considering the fact that “cost escalation has not decreased over the past 70 
years” (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003b).  
The problem of cost overruns is thus severe and persistent and probably affects every 
country investing in transport infrastructure. The question, however, is to what extent. The 
study by Flyvbjerg et al. (2002, 2003a, 2004) can be considered the leading piece of research 
into cost overruns because of the large number of projects included, the variety of project 
types, the long time period and the wide geographical coverage. However, the results of this 
study do not necessarily apply for individual countries. For example, the conclusions for 
Europe do not necessarily apply to each individual European country.  
Several studies on cost overruns have focused on individual countries. Table 1 gives an 
overview of these studies on cost overruns, their geographical area, the frequency and the 
magnitude of cost overruns. The study of Flyvbjerg et al. (2003a) is included in the table for 
reasons of comparison. Note that these studies measure cost overruns slightly differently, 
which is explained a few lines below the table.  
 
Table 1 Frequency and magnitude of cost overruns found in literature a 
Magnitude of cost overrun 
Road Rail Fixed Links Other 
Study  Geographical area Frequency 
cost 
overrun 
(%) 
% N % N % N % N 
Merewitz (1973) US 79 26 49 54 17     
Morris (1990) India    164 23   4 10 
Pickrell (1990, 1992)b US 88   61 8     
Auditor General (1994)c Sweden  86 8 17 7     
Nijkamp and Ubbels (1999) Netherlands, 
Finland 
75       0-20 8 
Bordat et al. (2004) US 55 5 2668d       
Odeck (2004) Norway 52 8 620       
Dantata et al. (2006) US 81   30 16     
Ellis et al. (2007) US  9 3130       
Lee (2008)e South Korea 95 11 138 48 16     
           
Flyvbjerg et al. (2003a) World 86 20 167 41 58 34 33   
a In which: %: the percentage cost overrun and N: the number of projects with cost overruns 
b In van Wee (2007) 
c In Odeck (2004) 
d Projects include: Road and bridge construction and rehabilitation projects; maintenance projects, with road maintenance and 
resurfacing contracts; Traffic and traffic maintenance contracts 
e In Siemiatycki (2009) 
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All of these studies show that cost overruns are more common than cost underruns, with 
frequencies ranging between 52% and 95%. Conversely, the magnitude of the cost overruns 
differs between the studies. As for the differences in average cost overruns between studies, 
the following main explanations can be given. First of all, the main reason for the differences 
in the average cost overrun between studies is the difference in the use of nominal and real 
prices (Flyvbjerg, 2007). Secondly, the way data are handled can explain the differences in 
the extent of cost overruns between studies (see for a more extensive elaboration Flyvbjerg et 
al., 2003b). Studies use a different moments for the year of decision to build and the year of 
completion as the basis for the estimated and actual costs, and hence the extent of the cost 
overruns differs. Thirdly, differences can also be related to the variation in sample size. If the 
sample size is small, outliers may have a large influence on the results. Fourthly, the 
differences can be explained by the differences in the geographical area that is covered 
(different economies), and the project types that are included (different project dynamics and 
complexity). 
Table 1 shows furthermore that the studies by Nijkamp and Ubbels (1999), Odeck (2004), 
Bordat et al. (2004) and Ellis et al. (2007) found rather small cost overruns – up to 20% – 
whereas Morris (1990) and the Auditor General of Sweden (in Odeck) found enormous cost 
overruns of 164% and 86% respectively. Due to the probability that there are large 
differences in cost overruns among countries and across time, cost overruns in country 
specific studies might be quite different (either lower or higher) from the average cost 
overruns in the worldwide study. However, the abovementioned findings do not support this 
expectation; some country specific studies have smaller average cost overruns and others 
higher average cost overruns compared to the worldwide study by Flyvbjerg et al. Ideally 
country specific studies should have the same methodology as this worldwide study in order 
to compare its results. Without a general tendency in country specific studies towards lower 
or higher average cost overruns than in the worldwide study, it remains difficult to make 
inferences about individual countries based on the worldwide database. This therefore 
supports the need for further research into country specific cost performance of transport 
infrastructure projects.  
The objective of this research is to determine the characteristics of cost overruns in Dutch 
large-scale transport infrastructure projects. This concerns the frequency and the magnitude 
of cost overruns and whether cost estimates have improved over time. This research was 
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financed by the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment and the Netherlands 
was therefore chosen as the country under scrutiny.  
We apply the same methodology as used for the worldwide research regarding project 
types, the way data and prices are used. A database of 78 Dutch large-scale transportation 
infrastructure projects was created and statistical analyses were used to determine the 
frequency and magnitude of cost overruns in the Netherlands and to examine whether cost 
estimates have become more accurate over time.   
 
In the literature on cost overruns (see table 1) hardly any attention is given to the project 
phases (with the exception of Odeck (2004)). Until now literature has focused on identifying 
cost overruns but the moment when projects are most vulnerable to cost increases has not 
been studied. This is however of the utmost importance because it could improve our 
understanding of cost overruns considerably. Whether cost increases are incremental over 
different project phases or extreme in certain project phases will help to distinguish between 
different explanations of cost overruns. It is essential to look more closely when cost 
increases occur to actually be able to deal with them. A second objective of this research is 
therefore to investigate whether projects are more vulnerable to cost increases during 
different project phases and if so which phase this concerns. A distinction was made between 
2 phases (data did not allow to distinguish between more phases): 1. the pre-construction 
phase (the period between the formal decision to build and the start of construction) and 2. 
the construction phase (the period between the start of construction and the start of operation 
(opening)). By addressing project phases in relation to project performance this paper fills a 
gap in literature on cost overruns and project management.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the project selection, data 
collection, representativeness of the database, and the main methodological issues. Section 3 
presents the cost performance in the Netherlands, focussing on the characteristics of cost 
overruns. In section 4 a comparison is made between the cost overruns in the pre-construction 
phase and in the construction phase. Finally, section 5 discusses the main conclusions and 
section 6 presents several areas for further research.    
 
 Project Selection, Data Collection and Methodology  
Definition Large-Scale Projects 
Large-scale projects are often defined as major infrastructure projects that cost more than 
US$1 billion (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003a). However, past studies have often included a wider 
range of projects, both smaller sized projects costing several million dollars and large-scale 
projects (see e.g. Flyvbjerg et al., 2003b, where the smallest project cost US$ 1.5 million, and 
Odeck, 2004, which included projects costing less than 15 million NOK ~ US$ 12.3 million). 
In addition to the size of the project in terms of costs, large-scale projects attract a high level 
of public attention or political interest because of substantial direct and indirect impacts on 
the community, environment, and budgets (FHWA in Capka, 2004). Therefore, the definition 
of a large-scale project can also depend on the context, that is, the size of the project in 
relation to the size of the city (or country). Based on project size, their impact and context, 
projects that cost more than about € 20 million are considered large-scale projects in the 
Netherlands1. Regarding transport infrastructures, we adopt the definition of van Wee 
(2007): “Transport infrastructures include roads, rail lines, channels, (extensions of) airports 
and harbours, bridges and tunnels. Of these projects the ‘hardware’ is considered, excluding 
‘software’; projects that are not related to the construction of infrastructure but are related to 
policies of deregulations, liberalization, privatization, and so forth”. In line with previous 
studies, the project types that are included in this research are road, rail, tunnel and bridge 
projects.  
 
Project Selection and Data Collection 
All large-scale transport infrastructure projects in the Netherlands that were completed after 
the year 1980 were selected. Projects completed before this year are excluded because the 
data were expected to be difficult to come by.  
Data were collected from a variety of sources, i.e. interviews with former project leaders 
and project teams; archives research at the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment; 
RWS2 Direction Large Projects and RWS Direction Zuid-Holland; internet search; and the 
MIRT reports. The MIRT (Meerjarenprogramma Infrastructuur, Ruimte en Transport, 
translated as the Multi-year programme for infrastructure, spatial planning and transport3) 
was a valuable source of information for both identifying large-scale road and rail projects 
and collecting data. The MIRT is the implementation programme related to the policy of 
‘mobility and water’. It is funded by the Infrastructure Fund of the Ministry of Infrastructure 
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and the Environment. The MIRT4 includes all infrastructure projects in the Netherlands. For 
this research the programmes for the years 1984-20105 were accessed.  
Based on the MIRT, 70 road and 39 rail projects were identified (one rail project falls out 
of the period 1984-2010 but is included because data for this project was readily available 
from the research of Flyvbjerg et al. (2003a)). Of these projects, 34 projects (23 road and 11 
rail) were rejected for reasons of limited data availability, and 12 projects (10 road and 2 rail) 
were rejected because the data was invalid.  
To identify tunnels we used an international database and gallery for structures – 
Structurae – (http://en.structurae.de) and to identify bridges we used the database of the 
National Bridge Foundation (NBF) (http://bruggenstichting.nl). However, neither of these 
databases includes data on costs and in order to select the large-scale projects, the length was 
used as a surrogate criterion for project size. Larger projects have a greater impact on the 
community, environment, and budgets and they require more effort to fit into the landscape, 
not only due to the development density but also for aesthetic reasons. Since the level of 
effort differs between bridges and tunnels, the definition of a large-scale project based on the 
project length differs as well. Bridge projects, for example, have a larger influence on the 
visual hindrance compared to tunnel projects and hence the minimum length of a large-scale 
project is less for bridge projects. The minimum length for projects is based on construction 
cost indices and was set at 500 meters for tunnels and 200 meters for bridges 
(http://www.bouwkostenkompas.nl)6. Data on fixed link projects was collected by means of 
interviews and archive research. In total, 27 tunnel and 25 bridge projects were identified. For 
38 of these projects data for crucial variables (e.g. costs or decision to build) were missing, so 
these projects could not be included in the database. To summarise, the database consists of 
78 projects. 
As may have become clear, the resulting database does not include all projects due to 
incompleteness of information, which may be regarded as non-response (thus not due to 
sampling mechanisms, because these were not applied). However, in line with previous 
international research in this field that also includes projects based on data availability, the 
database is considered to be a sample. In this research also non-significant differences will be 
reported because we are also interested in a complete description of the project performance 
of the specific projects in the database.  
 
 Representativeness 
For road and rail projects, the database is fairly representative. Data collection was based on 
the MIRT and was not dependent on retrieving information directly from project managers. 
Therefore bias, in the sense that managers may have an interest in whether or not data is 
provided and whether this is accurate or presented in a favourable light, probably does not 
play a role. For the fixed link projects, data was partly collected by means of interviews with 
project managers involving the risk of bias mentioned above. However, the average cost 
overruns for fixed link projects for which data was collected by means of interviews is not 
statistically different from the average cost overruns for fixed link projects for which data 
was collected by means of documentation research. (t=-1.414, p=0.188, N=15, independent 
sample t-test). The results need reservation because of the small number of projects.    
 
Methodology7 
The two most important data variables in this research are the estimated and actual costs. 
Cost overrun is measured as actual out-turn costs minus estimated costs expressed as a 
percentage of the estimated costs. Actual costs are defined as real, accounted construction 
costs determined at the time of project completion. Estimated costs are defined as budgeted 
or forecasted construction costs determined at the Time of formal Decision to build (ToD). 
This is also called the "decision date”, "the time of the decision to proceed," the "go-
decision" (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003a). At that moment, cost estimates were often available as 
data for decision-makers to make an informed decision.  
Estimated costs are the costs at the ToD. In line with Flyvbjerg et al. (2003a), when the 
costs are not available at the ToD, the nearest available reliable figure for estimated costs is 
used as a proxy. This is typically a later estimate, which is often more accurate, and therefore 
leads to lower cost overruns. By investigating the cases with complete information, it was 
estimated that the cost overruns presented in this study are about 1% lower because of this 
assumption. We did not correct cost estimates using this figure because it is based on many 
assumptions and only concerns a small deviation. Note that usually contingency costs are 
included in the estimated costs. The cost overruns as referred to in this study are therefore in 
excess of these contingency costs.  
The actual construction costs are the costs at the year of completion (year operations 
begun). If the actual costs are unknown at the time of project completion, the most reliable 
later figure for actual costs is used (i.e. from a year later than the opening year), if available. 
If unavailable, an earlier figure for actual costs was used (i.e., from a year before the opening 
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year), but only if at least 90% of the budget was spent at this time, i.e., the project was at least 
90% complete in financial terms. The cost overruns presented in this study are about 0.8% 
higher because of this assumption. For the same reason as given for estimated costs, we did 
not use this percentage as a correction factor.  
All costs were converted to 1995 prices using the appropriate historical and sectoral 
indices for discounting in the Netherlands to correct for inflation (similar to Flyvbjerg et al. 
2003a). Based on expert opinions8 the most appropriate indices were determined, which 
included the GWW index, an index by ProRail for rail projects and the CROW index9. 
Research on cost overruns typically presents costs without VAT. VAT is, therefore, also 
excluded in the costs for the projects in this research. In adjusting the costs for VAT, the 
difference between a low and high tariff as well as changes of the tariff over the years is 
taken into account. The methodology of data collection and the calculation of cost overruns 
was approved by two independent authorities from the Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment, i.e. RWS and KiM.  
 
 
Characteristics of Cost Overruns  
Magnitude of Cost Overruns 
Figure 1 shows a histogram with the distribution of cost overruns for all Dutch transportation 
infrastructure projects in the database.  
 
 
Figure 1 Distribution of cost overruns in Dutch transportation infrastructure projects 
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The histogram shows a large spread around zero indicating that the errors in forecasting costs 
are various and large. Furthermore, there is an asymmetrical distribution around zero, 
implying that errors in overestimating costs are different in size to errors in underestimating 
costs.  
 
The specific statistics are as follows (figures rounded off to one decimal)11:  
! The range of cost overrun is -40.3% to 164.0% 
! The average cost overrun is 16.5%. 
! The standard deviation is 40.0, indicating a rather large variation of the individual 
cost overruns around the mean.  
 
Figure 1 shows two striking features in the distribution of cost overruns. First of all, there is 
one project, The Tweede Heinenoordtunnel, with an extremely large cost overrun of 164.0%. 
It was the first tunnel in the Netherlands to be bored, and the additional complexity involved 
with this construction method can partly explain the cost overruns. If this project is excluded, 
the total average cost overrun decreases to 14.6% (SD=36.5). 
Secondly, a large number of projects (32%) have cost underruns in the category -20% to 
0%. Considering this group of projects in more detail, the results indicate that this group does 
not differ from the other projects in the database regarding project type. However, the group 
does differ in terms of project size (expressed in line with standard convention by estimated 
costs); the projects are considerably smaller with €119 million compared to the other projects 
with an average size of €317 million (p=0.235, independent sample t-test).  
 
Frequency of Cost Overruns 
The main findings regarding the frequency of cost overruns are as follows: 
! In 55% of the projects, actual costs are larger compared to estimated costs (resulting 
in cost overruns) whereas in 44% of the projects, actual costs are lower compared to 
estimated costs (resulting in cost underruns).  
! Projects with cost overruns are as common as projects with cost underruns10 
(p=0.428, binominal test). 
! Projects with cost overruns have an average overrun of 41.3% (SD=38.1). Projects 
with cost underruns have on average an underrun of 13.9% (SD=10.5) (Mann-
Whitney U =0.000, p=0.000, Mann-Whitney U-test).  
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Cost Performance Over Time  
In order to consider the project performance in terms of costs over time we consider time by 
the year of completion and the year of formal decision to build. According to Flyvbjerg et al. 
(2003b) “it is better to use year of decision to build rather than year of completion; the latter 
includes length of implementation phase, which has an influence on cost escalation, causing 
confounding”. Data on the year of completion is however more evident and hence more 
reliable. We therefore consider both time variables (see figures 2 and 3). One project is 
excluded from the analysis as it was completed in 1970 whereas the other projects were all 
completed in the period 1991-2009.  
 
Figure 2 does not give reason to assume a relation between the year of completion and cost 
overruns. Based on a regression analysis, we conclude that there is indeed no effect between 
both variables (F=0.002, p=0.964). For the relation between the year of decision to build and 
cost overruns (Figure 3) we also conclude that there is no statistical significant effect 
(F=2.486, p=0.119).  
   
 
Figure 2 Cost overruns over time (year of completion) 
 
Figure 3 Cost overruns over time (year of decision to build) 
  
Data showed that cost estimates have not improved over time. We therefore rule out technical 
explanations as the main reason for cost overruns in Dutch projects. These consider cost 
overruns the result of technical errors such as inadequate forecasting techniques. If technical 
explanations were the main cause of cost overruns, cost estimates should have improved over 
time since better methods have become available. Better methods would – all other factors 
remaining constant – result in better cost estimates, reducing the importance of the factors 
relevant for technical explanations for cost overruns. These findings are in line with the 
international research (Flyvbjerg et al. (2003a; 2003b).  
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In search for a possible explanation for the lack of improvement of cost estimates over 
time, the large construction fraud that was committed during the tendering for numerous 
governmental projects in the Netherlands could be considered. This construction fraud came 
to light in the year 2000, after which projects were set under stricter management. Therefore, 
if projects that were decided upon before 2000 have higher average cost overruns, 
construction fraud may be an explanation for the large and consistent cost overruns over time. 
It turns out that the average cost overrun for this group of projects (18.8%) is indeed 
significantly larger than the average cost overrun for projects that were decided upon from 
2000 onwards (-18.0%) (t=2.013, p=0.048). However, the number of projects completed is 
considerably lower (7%) than the number of projects completed before the year 2000 (93%). 
 
 
Cost Overruns during Different Project Phases 
This section discusses cost overruns during the project development. Note that actual cost 
overruns can only take place once the project is completed, but for reasons of simplicity we 
stick with this term. Hereby two project phases are distinguished: the pre-construction and the 
construction phase. 
The pre-construction phase is the period between the formal decision to build (ToD) and 
the start of construction. The construction phase is the period between the start of 
construction and the year of completion. Only those projects for which data on the essential 
variables are available are included.  
We excluded three projects for which data on the year of construction start were 
unavailable and fourteen projects for which data on the estimated costs at the time of 
construction start were unavailable. In some cases, construction started in the same year or 
even before the formal decision to build was made. These projects do not have an explicit 
pre-construction phase. The construction phase is then equal to the implementation phase and 
consequently the cost overrun in the construction phase is the same as the overall cost 
overrun. This would give a distorted picture regarding the phase in which the largest cost 
overruns take place and these projects were therefore not included in this analysis (24 
projects).  
To investigate the cost overruns during different phases, data from 37 projects were used. 
There is no systematic bias regarding these projects with respect to cost overruns compared to 
the other projects (t=0.483, p=0.630, independent sample t-test). 
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The cost overrun in the pre-construction phase is measured as the estimated costs at the 
start of construction minus the estimated costs at the ToD expressed as a percentage of the 
estimated costs at the ToD. The cost overrun in the construction phase is measured as the 
actual out-turn costs minus the estimated costs at the start of construction expressed as a 
percentage of the estimated costs at the start of the construction. Let us consider the project 
development consisting of three key moments: T0: formal decision to build (ToD), T1: start of 
construction, and T2: project opening. Consequently, the estimated costs at these moments 
can be referred to as follows: C0, C1, and C2 respectively, resulting in the following formulas 
for cost overruns:  
∆C pre-construction phase=  
∆C construction phase=  
 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of cost overruns in the pre-construction phase.  
 
Figure 4 Distribution of cost overruns in the pre-construction phase 
 
The histogram shows an asymmetric distribution around zero with a larger number of 
projects with cost overruns. The statistics for the cost overruns in the pre-construction phase 
are as follows: 
! The range of cost overruns is -39.5% to 112.1% 
! The average cost overrun is 19.7% 
! The standard deviation is 32.6   
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Three projects have extremely large cost overruns between 90% and 120%. One of the 
projects was confronted with large delays in the development plan procedures increasing the 
length of the pre-construction phase and possibly the costs. Large cost overruns in the pre-
construction phase suggest that the projects are relatively easy to construct and that the cost 
overruns are rather the result of a difficult decision-making process or large scope changes.    
 
The main findings regarding the frequency of cost overruns in the pre-construction phase are 
as follows: 
! In 70% of the projects, estimated costs increased, whereas in 30% of the projects, 
estimated costs stayed the same or decreased (p=0.020, binominal test).  
! For the projects with cost overruns, the average overrun is 30.8% (SD=32.5) and for 
the projects with cost underruns, the average underrun is 6.5% (SD=11.3) (p=0.002, 
Mann-Whitney U-test). 
Cost overruns are not only more frequent than cost underruns in the pre-construction phase, 
costs that have been underestimated are inaccurate to a larger extent than costs that have been 
overestimated.  
 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of cost overruns in the construction phase.  
 
Figure 5 Distribution of cost overruns in the construction phase 
 
The histogram of cost overruns in the construction phase is more symmetric than the one of 
the pre-construction phase but again the distribution is not symmetrically around zero; 
projects with cost overruns and with underruns differ. The statistics for the cost overruns in 
the construction phase are as follows: 
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! The range of cost overruns is -35.4% to 22.8% 
! The average cost overrun is -4.5% 
! The standard deviation is 14.4 
 
The main findings regarding the frequency of cost overruns in the construction phase are 
listed below: 
! In 38% of the projects cost overruns occur whereas in 62% of the projects cost 
underruns occur (p=0.188, binominal test).  
! For the projects with cost overruns, the average overrun is 9.5% (SD=7.4) and for the 
projects with cost underruns, the average cost underrun is 13.1% (SD=10.4) (p=0.347, 
Mann-Whitney U-test). 
 
It can be concluded that the main problem with cost overruns takes place even before 
construction has started. The frequency of cost overruns as well as the average overrun is 
larger in the pre-construction phase. The average cost overrun in the pre-construction phase is 
significantly higher than the average overrun in the construction phase (t=-4.118, p=0.000, 
paired-sample t-test).  
 
 
Conclusions and Discussion  
The objective of this study was two-fold: first of all it was aimed to determine the 
characteristics of cost overruns in Dutch large-scale transport infrastructure projects, and 
secondly it was aimed to investigate whether projects are more vulnerable to cost increases in 
certain phases of project development.  
Regarding the first objective, we found that cost overruns have been a problem for the last 
20 years. Further, although in the Netherlands cost overruns are about as common as cost 
underruns, the average overrun is larger than the average underrun. Overall, projects have an 
average overrun of 16.5%.  
Considering these findings we reject technical explanations as the main reason for 
forecasting errors in Dutch large-scale transport infrastructure projects. Technical 
explanations account for cost overruns in terms of imperfect forecasting techniques, 
inadequate data, honest mistakes, etc. If imperfect techniques were main explanations of the 
underestimations, an improvement in forecasting accuracy of time would be expected, since 
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errors and their sources would be recognised and addressed through the refinement of data 
collection, forecasting methods, etc, but accuracy has not improved over time. The cost 
underestimation in Dutch projects can better be explained by psychological and political-
economic explanations. The most common psychological explanation is probably “appraisal 
optimism”. According to this explanation, promoters and forecasters are held to be overly 
optimistic about project outcomes in the appraisal phase, when projects are planned and 
decided (Fouracre et al., 1990, p. 10; Mackie & Preston, 1998; Walmsley & Pickett, 1992, p. 
11; World Bank, 1994, p. 86 in Flyvbjerg et al., 2002, p 288). An optimistic cost estimate is a 
low one and if appraisal optimism is a cause of cost overrun, the actual costs would be higher 
than the estimated costs. Political-economic explanations see planners and promoters as 
deliberately and strategically underestimating costs when forecasting the outcomes of 
projects. They do this in order to increase the likelihood that it is their projects, and not those 
of the competition, that gain approval and funding (Wachs, 1989; Flyvbjerg et al. 2002). A 
strategic estimate of costs would be low, resulting in cost overrun. Optimism bias and 
strategic misrepresentation both involve deception, but where the latter is intentional - i.e., 
lying - the first is not. Optimism bias is self-deception. 
It is expected that the percentage cost overruns that are presented in this paper and also in 
other studies are underestimated due to the methodology (section 2) as well as due to the use 
of the formal decision to build as the basis for the estimated costs. The point at which 
decision-makers informally decide to carry out the project is often made before the formal 
decision to build (Cantarelli et al., 2010). This is referred to as the real (informal) decision to 
build as opposed to the formal decision to build. It is highly likely that the estimated costs at 
the formal decision to build are larger since estimated costs usually become more accurate 
over time. For example, costs increased on average by 63.4% between the first estimate and 
the estimate at the time of the formal decision to build. Consequently, when the smaller 
estimated costs at the formal decision to build are used to calculate the cost overruns, the 
overrun will be larger. Two case studies have shown that the cost overruns were 4 to 5 times 
larger when the estimated costs at the informal decision to build were taken as a reference 
(Cantarelli et al., 2010)12. Because it is almost impossible to determine the real decision to 
build, we used the formal decision to build as a reference but recognise that the calculated 
cost overruns are probably higher as a result.  
With respect to cost overruns during project development, the problem of cost overruns 
mainly occurs in the pre-construction phase, the period between the formal decision to build 
and the start of construction. The probability that projects incur cost overruns as well as the 
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average overrun is higher in this phase compared to that in the construction phase. Moreover, 
in the construction phase, most projects involve cost underruns and the average overrun is 
negative.  
The large difference in cost increase between the pre-construction and construction phase 
is remarkable. In an attempt to explain this, we have come up with four possible explanations. 
First of all, it could be the result of misconceived estimates. Over time, project plans become 
more detailed and costs can be better estimated. Secondly, the essence of the cost estimate 
changes over time. In the first phases of project development, the estimates are rough and 
have an “indicative” character whereas at the start of construction, the estimates are much 
more detailed and have a more “restrictive” nature that allows fewer adjustments. Thirdly, 
cost estimates are often optimistic and become more realistic as project plans develop. Since 
project plans in general change the most during the pre-construction phase, cost increases can 
be the result of this so-called optimism bias. Fourthly, costs could be kept low deliberately to 
get the project proposal accepted. After acceptance, the “real” estimates become known or 
scope changes are introduced (other than functional changes) that involve higher costs. Here, 
it is often referred to as salami-tactics, deliberately adding scope to the project. 
Further, a strikingly large number of projects were identified where construction started in 
the same year as the decision to build. This could be the result of the methodology but it is 
more likely to be the result of lock-in. The informal decision to build must have been taken 
earlier and preparations had already taken place and procedures had been started that allowed 
construction to start as soon as the formal decision to build was taken.  
 
 
Areas for Further Research  
This study was based on data from 78 projects and this was the best obtainable data within 
our research set, but further efforts to enlarge the database should be made. In addition, there 
are several important issues that need to be addressed in subsequent research. First of all, 
more insight should be obtained into the determinants of cost overruns for Dutch projects 
such as project type and project size. Secondly, this research has shown that projects are more 
prone to cost overruns in the pre-construction phase than in the construction phase. A related 
topic for further research is to investigate how the lengths of these phases correlate with cost 
overruns in the respective phases. It would further be interesting to disaggregate the cost 
overruns in the pre-construction and construction phase by project type and project size.  
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Thirdly, a systematic comparison with the Netherlands and other countries is useful to 
determine whether the differences between Dutch projects and those worldwide are 
statistically significant. We will explore these subjects, the determinants, the lengths of the 
project phases and the statistical significance of the difference between the Dutch and 
international findings in subsequent papers.   
We conclude with two areas for further research, which both require additional data 
collection. First of all, it would be useful to consider the cost overruns for different project 
phases for other countries as well. This would give insight into whether it is common for 
projects to have the largest cost increase in the pre-construction phase or whether this is a 
specific feature of Dutch projects. Differences in the decision-making procedures between 
countries should be taken into account when drawing conclusions. Secondly, although we 
recognise that it is very difficult to establish the time of the informal decision to build, more 
research is needed into this area as it considerably influences the extent of cost overruns.   
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Notes 
1. These are the costs at the time of project completion in 2010 prices. 
2. RWS, Rijkswaterstaat, is the executive agency of the Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment, responsible for the construction and maintenance of roads and waterways. 
3. The translation of the MIRT in English is based on:  
http://www.verkeerenwaterstaat.nl/english/topics/water/delta_programme/rules_and_fram
ework_of_the_mirt (consulted 20-03-2010) 
4. Note that the MIRT was called MIT until 2008; from 1984-1989 it was called MPP, 
translated here as Multi-year Passenger Transport Programme and spatial planning 
projects were not part of the programme, only passenger transport was included and not 
freight transport. 
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5. With the exception of MIRT 1985 
6. The use of length as a surrogate criterion was verified and with the specified minimum 
lengths the probability of rejecting projects that should have been included is minimised. 
7. The full methodological elucidation will be included in a PhD Thesis (forthcoming, 
2011), of which this paper makes up a part. 
8. By RWS direction Large Projects and KiM, Kennisinstituut voor Mobiliteitsbeleid 
(Netherlands institute for Transport Policy Analyses, an independent institute within the 
Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment) 
9. The GWW index concerns an index for “ground, water and road construction”. The 
CROW is a platform of knowledge on infrastructure, traffic and transport, and public 
space and provides a special index for large bridges and tunnels. 
10. One project had correct costs and is therefore combined with the projects with a positive 
cost performance record) 
11. Note that the indicated cost overruns in the referred paper differ from the cost overruns 
presented in this paper due to the difference in the use of current and constant prices. 
12. Two additional projects were excluded because their actual costs are more than €3,000 
million whereas the average cost is about €95 million for the other projects.  
13. The size of the project concerns here the actual costs, since these are the costs at actual 
opening. 
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